

**AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 117-13**

**OFFERED BY M**     .

Add at the end of subtitle E of title XII of division  
A the following:

1 **SEC. 12**     . **COUNTERING CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY MA-**  
2 **LIGN INFLUENCE.**

3 (a) **COUNTERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.—**

4 There is authorized to be appropriated \$300,000,000 for  
5 each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the Countering  
6 Chinese Influence Fund to counter the malign influence  
7 of the Chinese Communist Party globally. Amounts appro-  
8 priated pursuant to such authorization are authorized to  
9 remain available until expended and shall be in addition  
10 to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to  
11 counter such influence.

12 (b) **CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—**The obligation of  
13 funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made  
14 available pursuant to subsection (a) to counter the malign  
15 influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally shall  
16 be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with  
17 section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22  
18 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification procedures of—

1           (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the  
2           Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-  
3           resentatives; and

4           (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and  
5           the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

6           (c) POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND AP-  
7           PROVAL.—

8           (1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State  
9           shall designate an existing senior official of the De-  
10          partment of State at the rank of Assistant Secretary  
11          or above to provide policy guidance, coordination,  
12          and approval for the obligation of funds authorized  
13          to be appropriated or otherwise made available pur-  
14          suant to subsection (a).

15          (2) DUTIES.—The senior official designated  
16          pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for—

17                (A) on an annual basis, the identification  
18                of specific strategic priorities for obligating and  
19                expending funds authorized to be appropriated  
20                or otherwise made available pursuant to sub-  
21                section (a), such as geographic areas of focus or  
22                functional categories of programming that  
23                funds are to be concentrated within, consistent  
24                with the national interests of the United States  
25                and the purposes of this section;

1           (B) the coordination and approval of all  
2 programming conducted using such funds,  
3 based on a determination that such program-  
4 ming directly counters the malign influence of  
5 the Chinese Communist Party, including spe-  
6 cific activities or policies advanced by the Chi-  
7 nese Communist Party, pursuant to the stra-  
8 tegic objectives of the United States, as estab-  
9 lished in the 2017 National Security Strategy,  
10 the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and other  
11 relevant national and regional strategies as ap-  
12 propriate;

13           (C) ensuring that all programming ap-  
14 proved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to ma-  
15 lignant influence of the Chinese Communist Party  
16 described in subsection (d) and is in accordance  
17 with the efforts specified in subsection (e); and

18           (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and  
19 evaluation of the effectiveness of all program-  
20 ming conducted using such funds to ensure the  
21 advancement of United States interests and  
22 degradation of the malign influence of the Chi-  
23 nese Communist Party.

1           (3) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The senior  
2           official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall,  
3           in carrying out paragraph (2), seek to—

4                   (A) conduct appropriate interagency con-  
5                   sultation; and

6                   (B) ensure, to the maximum extent prac-  
7                   ticable, that all approved programming under  
8                   such paragraph (2) functions in concert with  
9                   other Federal activities to counter the malign  
10                  influence of the Chinese Communist Party.

11           (4) ASSISTANT COORDINATOR.—The Adminis-  
12           trator of the United States Agency for International  
13           Development shall designate a senior official at the  
14           rank of Assistant Administrator or above to assist  
15           and consult with the senior official designated pur-  
16           suant to paragraph (1).

17           (d) MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this section, the term  
18           “malign influence” with respect to the Chinese Com-  
19           munist Party includes acts conducted by the Chinese Com-  
20           munist Party or entities acting on its behalf that—

21                   (1) undermine a free and open international  
22                   order;

23                   (2) advance an alternative, repressive inter-  
24                   national order that bolsters the Chinese Communist

1 Party's hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by  
2 coercion and dependency;

3 (3) undermine the national security or sov-  
4 ereignty of the United States or other countries; or

5 (4) undermine the economic security of the  
6 United States or other countries, including by pro-  
7 moting corruption.

8 (e) COUNTERING MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this sec-  
9 tion, countering malign influence includes efforts to—

10 (1) promote transparency and accountability,  
11 and reduce corruption, including in governance  
12 structures targeted by the malign influence of the  
13 Chinese Communist Party;

14 (2) support civil society and independent media  
15 to raise awareness of and increase transparency re-  
16 garding the negative impact of activities related to  
17 the Belt and Road Initiative and associated initia-  
18 tives;

19 (3) counter transnational criminal networks  
20 that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of  
21 the Chinese Communist Party;

22 (4) encourage economic development structures  
23 that help protect against predatory lending schemes,  
24 including support for market-based alternatives in

1 key economic sectors, such as the digital economy,  
2 energy, and infrastructure;

3 (5) counter activities that provide undue influ-  
4 ence to the security forces of the People's Republic  
5 of China;

6 (6) expose misinformation and disinformation  
7 of the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda, in-  
8 cluding through programs carried out by the Global  
9 Engagement Center of the Department of State; and

10 (7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist  
11 Party to legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology  
12 and governance models.

